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Polygon PoS hard-fork proposal would reassign frozen POL from alleged attacker addresses

For builders, the key question in a Polygon PoS hard-fork proposal is what the change would do to account balances. Freezing an address restricts transactions; the proposed fork would go further by changing balances without signatures from those addresses’ private keys.

As reported by Odaily on November 5, 2026, Polymarket and Binance proposed setting the balances of five alleged attacker addresses to zero and crediting an equal amount—about 70.49 million POL—to recovery addresses they designated. The article valued that amount at approximately $6.7 million in its description of the proposal and approximately $6.5 million later in its analysis. It said total POL supply would remain unchanged.

Odaily linked the proposal to two reported October 30 incidents: a compromise of Polymarket’s front end and one of a Binance hot wallet. According to the article, Polygon validators froze four addresses associated with the Polymarket incident, holding 23.86 million POL, and one associated with the Binance incident, holding 46.63 million POL. The article said Polymarket had sought the attackers’ cooperation without receiving a reply. It also attributed to the proposal a claim that an attacker offered Polygon validators cash to unfreeze addresses; that claim was not independently established in the article.

At the time of publication, the change had not been approved or implemented. Odaily said the Polymarket and Binance teams were due to present it at a Polygon Protocol Governance Call at 22:30 Beijing time on November 5. It reported no public position from Polygon officials, relevant governance participants or core developers before publication. The proposers said the action would apply only to addresses involved in these two incidents, not establish a general recovery mechanism.

The distinction matters for contract users: a freeze leaves the recorded balance in place, while the proposed state change would remove POL from specified accounts and credit other accounts without the holders’ signatures. Odaily compared the governance question with Ethereum’s 2016 response to The DAO exploit and a Core Network hard fork announced on November 2, 2026. Those precedents do not establish what Polygon would decide. Odaily’s view that approval was unlikely was an assessment, not a governance outcome.